Special Standing Committee

[Mr. George Stevenson in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

Clause 18 - PLACING CHILDREN WITH PARENTAL CONSENT

Amendment proposed [27 November]: No. 42, in page 12, line 35, after the word `child', to insert the words 
`with reference having been made to the expressed wishes of the child himself (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding)'.—[Mr. Loughton.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Tim Loughton: We are awaiting the Minister's response.

Jacqui Smith: I start by welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Stevenson. We had a good debate on Tuesday while your co-Chairman, Mrs. Roe, was in the Chair.
 Before I respond to the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), it may be useful to remind the Committee of the purposes of clauses 17 to 34. They introduce the new system of placement for adoption through adoption agencies, and significantly reform the legal process for adoption. One advantage of the proposals is that they will replace the legally unsatisfactory freeing provisions, so that birth parents can voluntarily relinquish their children for adoption. Freeing orders have been widely criticised. Once they are made, they leave the children legally without parents, and parental responsibility is transferred to the adoption agency. Many stakeholder groups have welcomed the abolition of freeing orders. 
 The new system ensures that substantial decisions about whether adoption is the right option for the child and whether the birth parents consent are taken earlier in the adoption process. Courts are involved where necessary. The Government believe that greater certainty and stability for children will be provided by dealing with the bulk of issues around consent to adoption before they are placed with their new families. 
 The new system will also be fairer to birth families who, under the current system, can be faced with a fait accompli at the final adoption order hearing if the child has already been with the prospective adopters for several months. The new provisions also minimise the uncertainty for prospective adopters and reduce the risk of their facing a contested final adoption order hearing. Once the issues around placement have been resolved, there are limits to the circumstances in which the adoption order may be opposed. 
 There are two routes to adoption through an adoption agency. The first route is through voluntary placement with parental consent, which is open to adoption agencies and local authorities. The second route is through placement for adoption under a placement order where there is no parental consent, and is open only to local authorities. Where a local authority is authorised to place a child for adoption with parental consent or under a placement order, subsection (2) provides that the child is to be considered a looked-after child to ensure that the local authority properly reviews and supervises the adoptive placement and promotes and safeguards the child's welfare. It will also mean that children placed for adoption will have access to the varied services for looked-after children, and should help to ensure that they are properly supported in the unfortunate event of the adoptive placement breaking down. Under subsection (4), placement has an extended meaning and covers placing a child with prospective adopters and, if a child has already been placed for other purposes—with a foster carer, for example—leaving the child with the carer as an approved prospective adopter. 
 Having considered some of the wider issues around placement provisions, I now turn to amendment No. 42. The Government believe that the amendment is unnecessary, because clause 1(4)(a) requires the agency, in deciding whether a child should be placed for adoption, to ascertain the child's wishes and feelings and to take them into account, in the light of their age and understanding, as part of the decision-making process. Clause 1(1) makes it clear that the obligations in the rest of clause 1 apply 
``whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child.''
 Current regulations require an agency to make a decision based on advice from its adoption panel that adoption is in the child's best interest. Similar regulations will be made under the Bill, and they will set out the process for ensuring that the agency takes proper account of the child's view in the decision-making process, as it is obliged to by clause 1. The new adoption agencies regulations that will accompany the implementation of the Bill will place explicit obligations on agencies to consult the child, to record its views, to ensure that its views are considered in the decision-making process—for example, by adoption panels—and, if the child's views are not acted on, to record the reasons why not.

Robert Walter: Is the Minister not aware that, in evidence laid before the Committee, the Adoption Law Reform Group asked that as part of proceedings the child, subject to his or her age, should have to consent, or refuse to consent, to the adoption? Several important bodies have been involved in the sittings: the Association of Directors of Social Services, the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering, the British Association of Social Workers, and so on. Do the Government not accept their views?

Jacqui Smith: We had considerable discussion about the principle of consent on Tuesday, and there was wide acknowledgement of the burden that would be placed on a child if they were asked to consent directly. Furthermore, that is not what amendment No. 42 is about. As mentioned on Tuesday, the Government have considerable concerns about requiring a child to consent, either directly to an adoption or indirectly through other decision-making processes. For that reason, we argued against the need for it. Given the assurances that I have offered, I repeat my request that the amendment be withdrawn.
Mr. Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) rose—

George Stevenson: I call Mr.—

Jonathan Djanogly: Djanogly. On Tuesday, Mr. Stevenson, we were all wondering how to pronounce the name of a Welsh constituency.
 I believe that we all agree that the Bill is aiming—in some ways, more than the Adoption Act 1976—to put the child's rights more to the fore. When debating our amendments on how the child's rights should be stated, the argument seems always to return to the fact that they will be set out in regulations—but we have had no sight of those regulations. If a child is to have rights, they should be reflected in the legislation.

Tim Loughton: I welcome you to the Committee, Mr. Stevenson. We have a marathon stretch ahead of us. You have already encountered the difficulty in pronouncing certain names—you are lucky that you did not have to question Professor Triseliotis last week.
 I thank the Minister for her response to the amendment which, as I explained when I moved it, is a probing amendment. It harks back to the concerns that we have expressed throughout our deliberations that the child should play a greater part in the adoption placement process. We expressed concerns earlier in the week about how the appropriate agencies should go about ascertaining the wishes of the child, and we argued that that should certainly include direct contact, which is not explicitly stated in the Bill. The Minister has gone some way to assuring us, particularly by saying that the regulations will place explicit obligations on the agencies to refer to children and that if they do not do so they will have to give a good account of themselves as to why not. Given that assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 41. in page 12, line 37, after `identified' insert `(directly or indirectly)'.
 If you had been with us on Tuesday afternoon, Mr. Stevenson, you would have an inkling about what I am about to say. However, I fear that I am going to bore the rest of the Committee by repeating some of the comments that I erroneously made prematurely at that stage. 
 The amendment addresses a point that has been raised by the British Association of Social Workers. It is a probing amendment in order to gain clarification on procedure. We are not sure whether the present arrangements, whereby a parent may consent to adoption by specific adopters whose identity is protected by a serial number, is to be continued. The Bill implies that adopters are to be named. Will it still be possible for a parent to agree to an adoption by unnamed specific adopters about whom the parent has received information? A child needs to be afforded a measure of protection if he or she has come from a violent background—which is the reason for adoption in the first place. Where the child is living with their adopted parents should not be disclosed directly. I ask for the Minister's clarification on whether the present system of partial anonymity is to continue.

Jacqui Smith: I can help the hon. Gentleman. The word ``identified'' was deliberately included in this version of the Bill instead of ``named'', which was the term used in the 1996 draft Bill, with the aim of enabling parents to consent to placement with specific adopters whose name they did not know but with whose characteristics and details they may be familiar through, for example, an anonymised profile passed on by the adoption agency. I assure the hon. Gentleman that identification on the consent form by serial number will be allowed.

Tim Loughton: That is straightforward. My only query is whether ``anonymised'' is a word in the English language. It sounds like the civil servants have been working overtime to produce that one. On the basis of the Minister's clear clarification, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Hilton Dawson: I am grateful for the opportunity to express some qualms about the clause—and about chapter 3, with which it is intimately linked.
 Yesterday, a young woman who works for a national care organisation came to see me about another aspect of the Bill. I had met her and her delightful five-year-old daughter previously at a conference. They are great together, as anyone who saw them would acknowledge. While discussing other parts of the Bill, she told me her own story. She is a highly intelligent and articulate young woman who can stand up for herself. She had been in care most of her life and became pregnant at the age of 16. She was due to have a baby, but had no family support. Understandably, she was nervous at the prospect. She confided to her social worker at a fairly early stage of the pregnancy that if she felt that her child would have the sort of upbringing that she had endured for 16 years, she would certainly view adoption as in the child's best interests. 
 Anyway, she duly gave birth. Having been only a spectator at these events, I do not know about such things, but apparently it was a difficult birth. Both she and her baby were ill. She gave birth in the morning. Still under the influence of medication, she was asked in the afternoon to sign a form to consent to placing the child for adoption. I repeat that she is an articulate, intelligent and strong-willed person. Even in such a state, she was able to refuse the opportunity, stand up to the local authority for several weeks and assert her right to look after her child. She now has an excellent relationship with her child and things are definitely looking up for both of them. That is an example of extremely bad social work practice—and there is no way that we can legislate for that. 
 My worry is that the clause and chapter 3 will make that young woman's position even worse. The Children Act is good legislation, although we should still try to improve and build on it. Certain aspects of the proposed provisions ring alarm bells. If the young person to whom I referred had been dealt with under them, her parental responsibility could, quickly and without recourse to a court, have ended up being shared with the local authority and the prospective adopters. That major change would undermine a fundamental element of the Children Act, which asserts that parental responsibility can be transferred only by a court. 
 The Bill harks back to the Children Act 1948, which became discredited over the years. It was replaced by the 1989 Act, which removed the ability of local authorities to declare parental rights resolutions without recourse to a court. Those resolutions transferred parental rights from parents to local authorities. We should tread carefully in seeking to amend legislation that has been on the statute book for 10 years, has stood the test of time and has proved to be workable. 
 Under the Bill, even if the young person had not got to the stage where her parental rights were removed, she could not simply tell the local authority that she wanted her child returned to her, as she could under section 20 of the Children Act if the child was placed voluntarily in care. She could be required to wait for 14 days before the child was returned to her. That is a major amendment to a Children Act whose fundamental principles have widespread support, especially in the social work profession, and that has been shown to work well. 
 I am also concerned that the provisions are so complicated—[Laughter.] This is a serious point. The proposed legislation is not just for politicians, and certainly not just for lawyers. Children, young people and parents must be able to understand it. Social workers must certainly be able to understand it, and to use it daily. I used the 1989 Act for six years, but have not used it for the past four years and I am struggling with it as I am a bit rusty. There is no reason why the chapter should not be easier to understand. 
 Adoption is extremely complicated. The child's needs must be understood, the birth family and relationships must be assessed, and the child must be matched with prospective adopters. Trying to predict how things will work involves such fundamental and morally difficult issues that we do not need extra complications from the law. We need a law that has understandable architecture. The significance of the Children Act, which goes far beyond situations such as the one we are discussing, is that it has such a comprehensible structure. 
 We have discussed clause 1, which is a complex but clear and balanced piece of legislation. However, neither the clause nor this accompanying one have such clarity. It is beyond our ability today to table and fit cogently the necessary amendments to this and related clauses, but I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to ensure further discussion between officials and organisations such as BASW, the Family Rights Group and BAAF, which have expressed concern about the issues. Much of the legislation is excellent, but freeing provisions must be abolished. The advantage of placement orders is that they speed up the process of getting into court and making clear decisions about the way forward. 
 There are two routes into the care system under the Children Act: through section 20, when a child arrives voluntarily and is accommodated by the local authority, and through section 31, when a child's case is looked at compulsorily under a care order. I urge my hon. Friend to consider whether a local authority should seek a placement order whether or not a child comes into the system under a voluntary or compulsory route. 
 We heard in a previous sitting about children in the adoption process having to make two court appearances. One court appearance is necessary—to deal with the adoption order. I strongly suggest, in line with the Family Rights Group, that regardless of the route on which children enter the system, there might be great merit in the local authority going for a placement order in the first instance if they want to go for adoption. That would enable a decision to be made on whether adoption is the best option, whether the parents' consent should be dispensed with and whether there might be other placement options. It would also allow permission to place to be obtained. 
 I hope that a child's legal status will remain the same under such a system, so that he or she would still be accommodated under section 20 or, for compulsory care, under section 31. However, if the threshold conditions are met when a child comes before a court for a placement order, that should surely be the stage at which a care order is made, to ensure that the child is given sufficient protection. That would deal with the 14-day limit on removing children from care and the transfer of parental responsibility. Early, meaningful decisions could be taken and there would be the sort of openness that everyone wants to encourage in adoption. There would be compliance with the Children Act, which is good legislation. The legislation would be more coherent for the people who have to use the system. I hope that my hon. Friend agrees that significant discussion is needed on these issues between our officials and the groups that are so concerned.

Jacqui Smith: I will respond to all the points that my hon. Friend has made in a moment. The clause allows parents to consent to their child being placed for adoption through an adoption agency. It is important to provide a route through the difficult area of adoption which allows parents to consent without necessarily having to go through unnecessary court cases, as would happen if a placement order were required in every case. I will come to the significant safeguards shortly. A parent can consent to the child being placed with specific identified perspective adopters or with adopters whom the adoption agency selects.
 My hon. Friend raised several understandably important points of concern. He highlighted a sad case of a young woman who was asked to provide consent for adoption on the same day—soon after—she gave birth. Under clause 50, no consent can be given for the adoption of a baby less than six weeks old, and so the situation that he described could not happen. Considerable support and regulation would surround the form and the nature of any consent and the extent to which it would be possible to withdraw it. I will talk about that more in a minute and certainly in relation to later clauses. 
 My hon. Friend makes a very reasonable call for clarity and simplicity in the system. Without speaking ill of courts or lawyers, I am not convinced that insisting on a court case, even when there may be no need for one, will introduce either clarity or simplicity—for birth parents, prospective adopters, or most importantly the children themselves.

Hilton Dawson: I am sure that my hon. Friend would acknowledge that at some point in every adoption case a court appearance is necessary. Would not the use of placement orders in the manner that I described simplify that experience in court and resolve fundamental issues more efficiently?

Jacqui Smith: We certainly agree that one of the advantages of the placement provisions is that they ensure that the difficult issues of consent and placement are dealt with much earlier in the process and that there are two routes—one through the courts, via a placement order. However, I still contend that it is right to provide a route through which parents can voluntarily consent that their children be placed for adoption with, of course, the proviso that they can withdraw that consent at any point up to the time when an application is made for an adoption order. My hon. Friend may have qualms about the removal provisions, but it is important to remember that. We are not asking parents to consent and then to find that there is no way out; parents can consent and then even in the case of advanced consent, to which we will come in a moment, they can withdraw that consent at any point up to the time when an application is made.
 My hon. Friend also raised points about parental responsibility, questioning the way in which it is shared under the provisions for placement with consent. I hope that I can reassure him. Parental responsibility can not be shared unless the birth parent consents or a placement order has been made through a court case. Parental responsibility is not transferred; we need to be clear about that. We should remind ourselves of the present system. Under freeing orders, parental responsibility was transferred; it was taken away from birth parents and given to the adoption agency, and thus no longer remained with birth parents. Alternatively, in the case of children who were already in care, an application for an adoption order was made without the issue of consent having been addressed. As I said earlier, the placement provisions overcome the fait accompli that birth parents faced under the old system. Under the new placement provisions, parental responsibility will not be transferred; it will be shared between birth parents, the adoption agency and, as the placement goes on, the prospective adopters.

Hilton Dawson: Does my hon. Friend acknowledge that the provision marks a significant break with the Children Act? It means that an adoptive parent, or the local authority, will acquire a share in the parental responsibility without going through a court process.

Jacqui Smith: That could happen only if the parents consent to it. That brings me to the restrictions and the safeguards that we need to place around the consent process, and the important matter of sharing parental responsibility.
 When there is consent to placement for adoption, parental responsibility is given to the adoption agency and shared with the prospective adopters once the child is placed. However, in contrast to freeing orders, the birth parents will retain parental responsibility up to the final adoption order, although their ability to exercise it may be limited. I shall state what I believe are the justifiable reasons for that proposal in clause 24. 
 The sharing of parental responsibility once the child is placed will help the management of the placement by making it clear that the agency and the adopters have responsibility for the child and can make day-to-day decisions. It is appropriate for the adoption agency, which has overall responsibility for managing the placement, to be able to determine the extent to which the birth parents may exercise parental responsibility. However, I emphasise that parental responsibility has not been transferred but shared in such cases. 
 My hon. Friend also raised the important case of a child who is voluntarily accommodated, and spoke of his concerns about the removal provisions. We must be clear that a child who is voluntarily accommodated cannot be deemed to be placed for adoption with, for example, foster carers without the consent of the parents. When considering the 14-day removal period, we must remember the direction of travel. If a child is voluntarily accommodated to provide respite or support for the family, or to enable rehabilitation, it is right that the parents have their child returned directly to them when they ask for that voluntary accommodation to end. 
 However, it is different when the direction of travel is towards adoption. In such cases, the child would probably have been spoken to when they were first accommodated and prepared for leaving their original mother and father for a new family. The birth parents would still have the right to remove their consent for the placement, but if they did, the local authority would have 14 days either to return the child to the birth parents or consider whether it wanted to go through the placement order process. In that situation, 14 days would be reasonable, given that everything that the child would have experienced before that would have been geared towards adoption. It does not seem unreasonable to have a period of time within which that child could then be prepared to return to their parents. That is qualitatively different from voluntary accommodation with the intention that the child will be returned to their family.

Jonathan Djanogly: Are there circumstances in which a child could be adopted in less than 14 days after a placement order?

Jacqui Smith: I think not, but I will come back to the hon. Gentleman if I am wrong. Given that we have made provision for three months between notice of intention to adopt and the application, I suspect that it would be impossible for there to be less than 14 days. Those three months are important, because they provide the birth parent with the ability to exercise their right to have their child returned to them, notwithstanding the 14 days' maximum removal period.
 To summarise, the local authority cannot get a share of the parental responsibility unless the parent has given consent or the authority goes through a placement order court case. We will deal with the detail of consent, because it is important to be clear about safeguards and the process of granting and withdrawing consent. I emphasise that the forms for consent to placement and withdrawal will be prescribed to show clearly the full implications of what is involved. An independent Children and Family Court Advisory Service officer will witness consent to ensure that it is properly given. That will involve talking through the implications to ensure that the type of situation mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson), in which someone is rushed or bamboozled into giving consent, could not happen. Placement with consent is intended to be a voluntary process. Birth parents can withdraw their consent at any point up to an application for an adoption order.

Hilton Dawson: Does my hon. Friend accept that it is very difficult to have these discussions when one has not seen the detail of the regulations? In fact, the witnessing of the consent agreement by a CAFCASS officer is a very important provision. Members of the Committee need to be aware of such regulations when discussing the issues covered by the Bill.

Jacqui Smith: I should make it clear that the provision on witnessing by a CAFCASS officer is in clause 97. The point that we discuss legislation and then perhaps need to look at the details afterwards is frequently made, although the same process was used for the Children Act. It seems sensible and logical to set out the principles in legislation and then provide the opportunity to discuss concerns, which may then need to be represented in regulations. It is also necessary to enable wide and full consultation on the regulations to ensure that the issues raised, as well as any others on the detail of the regulations, are taken into consideration.

Jonathan Djanogly: Will someone who is going to give consent be entitled to legal representation? Will they get legal aid for that representation?

Jacqui Smith: I do not believe that that would be appropriate. As I have spelled out, they will have the independent support and witness of a CAFCASS officer. That is an important assurance. The nature, form and withdrawal of the consent will also be designed in such a way that it will be very clear to that person what they are and are not consenting to when undergoing the process.
 The clause strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of the birth parents and stability and security for the child and the prospective adopters where consent to placement has been given. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - Advance consent to adoption

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 46, in page 13, line 25, after `section', insert
`and will be given a written explanation as to the timing and procedure by which consent can be withdrawn.'.
 In his interesting speech on clause 18, the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre highlighted problems with the Bill. Even with all the advisers and expert witnesses available to Committee members, it is complicated enough. It will be particularly complicated for children and prospective adoptive parents, and especially for birth parents who, at a highly emotional and difficult time, are in the process of voluntarily or involuntarily giving up their children for adoption. Anything that we can do under the Bill to clarify that situation and make it less able to be challenged in the courts through messy and long-running proceedings must be in the interests of all concerned. 
 In her comments on clause 18, the Minister stressed that a parent who has consented to giving up his or her child for adoption has every opportunity to withdraw their consent, right up to the granting of the adoption order. I agree that that is important. During such a highly emotional time, the circumstances of the parent may change daily or weekly—particularly those of a young mother who did not expect to fall pregnant and is faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to keep her child or give it up for adoption in the belief that the child would have better opportunities if looked after by someone else. That is a difficult decision. 
 Interestingly, the problem has featured heavily in various television programmes and newspapers recently. Dear Deirdre recently dealt with adoption in The Sun, and the nation's favourite soap tackled the issue and realistically portrayed the dilemma faced by someone considering whether to give up their child for adoption. Other television programmes, obviously taking their cue from the legislation and the proceedings of this Committee, have tackled the complex subject. 
 The amendment aims to be helpful and lessen confusion. We constantly refer to the flow chart at the back of the explanatory notes, yet I still need a dark room and a wet towel around my head to get my mind around it. How will the person who is actually faced with the various options and procedures represented in the flow chart make sense of the measure? 
 If a parent, after taking the decision that it is in the best interests of his or her child to be given up for adoption, makes the process easier by giving consent, which will speed up the process—speed is always of the essence, because the child should be settled in a new, stable, long-term environment as soon as possible, particularly if there are threats of domestic violence—surely it is only right that that parent should have properly explained to them the procedure by which they can withdraw their consent should circumstances alter or they have a change of heart as they realise, as the time draws nearer, the full implications of giving up their child for irreversible adoption. Instead of simply thrusting a flow chart into the hands of parents who may be in a state of semi-trauma or explaining references to a flow chart that appeared in some regulation, the agency should be obliged to provide a clear, explicit and simple written explanation of timings and the procedure by which they can withdraw their consent. 
 One representation sent to the Committee cites an instance in the 1980s of a parent who, by force of circumstances—she was going abroad—placed her daughter in voluntary, short-term care with foster parents, under the aegis of Surrey county council social services department. Much to her consternation, she returned to find that her child had been placed in permanent adoption without her knowledge. That is an extreme case, although I have heard of similar ones. 
 The point is that it is surely incumbent on the authority and agencies involved fully to inform the parent at every step of the way, and to make the process as simple as possible. That is why I am asking that, instead of a complicated flow chart, there should be an obligation to tell the person concerned, ``Here are your options. If you consent at this stage and sign on the dotted line, until a certain date you will be able to reverse that consent, and the way to do so is through''—for example—``form A.'' 
 That simple requirement would not place an enormous extra bureaucratic burden on the agencies concerned. It would avoid the subsequent challenge that adoption took place without parental consent, because the parent would be fully appraised of the options during the difficult time leading up to the granting of the adoption order. That simple requirement is all we are asking for. No great expense or extra burden of work would be involved. It would ensure that the parent is absolutely certain of their decision, and if they change their mind they can notify the relevant authorities.

Jonathan Djanogly: I certainly support the amendment, although it could go a little further by making it clear that the written explanation should be given when consent is given. The person who is consenting clearly has a right to know the implications of what they are doing. One of the Bill's aims, which we all support, is to facilitate and speed up the adoption process. In certain cases, there could be a family incident, and even though a clear explanation is given at the time, the adopter could be left in a state of shock and consternation. After a discussion, the social worker might decide that adoption is the right course of action. It is therefore more important than ever to establish safeguards such as those that have been proposed.
 It is right that notice be given, but during the period in which consent can be withdrawn, will such a person have access to on-going advice? Will advice stop when consent is given? If the person concerned—who may have come out of a vulnerable situation and is a bit more clear-thinking after the consent date—wanted advice, would she or he have to take it from social workers, who may be interested in expediting the adoption, or would there perhaps be access to a voluntary agency? That should be made clear on the form, as proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham.

Jacqui Smith: The clause enables a parent to give advance consent to the final adoption order either at the same time as they give consent to placement or at any time afterwards, and is a means of allowing people voluntarily to give up their child for adoption. It is therefore incumbent on us to ensure that the consent arrangements are fully clear and understood and that people are supported in their decision making. That is why the form of consent and withdrawal of consent will be prescribed in regulations made under clause 50(7) to accompany the implementation of the Bill. It is intended that the form of consent will make clear both the implications of giving advance consent and the process involved in withdrawing it.
 Advance consent to placement and adoption will be witnessed by an independent Children and Family Court Advisory Service officer, who will ensure that parents fully understand the implications of what they are agreeing to and that consent is properly given in full understanding of all that it involves. The officer will report that to the court. Clause 97(1) provides for the appointment of CAFCASS officers. 
 The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham is being either disingenuous or slightly mischievous in suggesting that the flowchart will be used by CAFCASS officers and others who support birth parents. In fact, the flowchart is designed to support legislators in the process of understanding, and I am extremely proud of it. 
 The adoption agencies regulations will oblige agencies to make clear to parents the timing and procedure for giving and withdrawing consent, as well as the legal and procedural implications of giving advance consent to adoption alongside consent to placement. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the need to provide a written explanation of the process will remain in regulations. It is currently in regulation 7. As for the possibility of a birth parent being in a state of shock when giving advance consent, I assure members of the Committee that advance consent to adoption can be withdrawn at any point until an adoption application has been made. 
 To respond to the questions raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), the measures for adoption support that we will discuss under clause 2 and related clauses also make provision for adoption support for birth parents. 
 Given those assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham feels able to withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am greatly humbled by the Minister's sensitivities about her flowchart. There was no derogatory intent—

Jacqui Smith: Yes, there was.

Tim Loughton: All right, there was. It is a terrible flowchart, and it confuses everybody.
 I endorse the useful comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon. Explanation should be given at a very early stage and that should be tied down in the Bill. The Minister referred to the need for continuing advice. When we discuss clauses 2 to 16, we shall seek specific guarantees from the Government on the way in which such support services will operate. According to the Minister, they will be available to the birth parent as well, which is helpful. 
 I was not aware that a written explanation of the options open is currently prescribed under regulation 7 and the Government intend that to continue. That, too, is helpful. The full answer that has been given goes a good way towards giving us the assurances that we require. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in page 13, line 26, leave out from `section' to end of line 30 and insert
`will automatically be informed by the adoption agency of any application for an adoption order unless he has withdrawn his right to receive such information.'.
 We will discuss the amendment without reference to the flowchart. The amendment deals with the notification of parents who have consented to adoption, and would remove part of subsection (4). It strikes me as odd to ask a parent who has given consent to adoption, in effect, to opt into an information system. For the reasons that I mentioned earlier about the pressures on a parent about to give up a child for adoption, there should be a statutory right for that parent automatically to be told about the various processes that are coming up. It seems for the Bill to state that a parent has to express his or her wish to be informed of any application for an adoption order—a key part of the whole process. Surely, it should be that person's automatic right to be notified that a significant juncture in the process is about to be reached. 
 The amendment also raises the question, which I mentioned earlier, of the satisfactory notification of such a person on how to exercise their right to withdraw consent. If they are not automatically told that an adoption order is being applied for, they may not know that the period within which they may withdraw their consent is running out. The amendment would give that person an automatic right to be informed by the adoption agency of any application for an adoption order unless they have opted out of the system. 
 If, for some reason, a person made the decision to be completely divorced from the proceedings, because they were handing their child over and were adamant that they had made up their mind and did not want further information, that would be entirely up to them—they could opt out—but surely it is right for everyone else—the majority, I imagine—to be automatically informed when every stage is coming up, especially the application for an adoption order. They will then know what time they have in which to take avoiding action if they have changed their mind. It is a basic human right automatically to be given information about the future destination of one's child during the adoption process. 
 I hope that the amendment is helpful. It is intended to make the legislation absolutely watertight and ensure that parents are fully apprised of all facts at every juncture, giving them the opportunity to continue with the decision made, or to reverse or block that decision.

Jacqui Smith: The Government believe that the Bill already provides what is needed in terms of giving notice in cases of advance consent. It is important to understand the difference between clause 18 and clause 19. The purpose of clause 19 is to allow, in the rare cases that arise, advance consent to be given to the making of the final adoption order at the same time as consent to placement. That will make provision for cases in which parents want to relinquish a child for adoption and not be further involved in the legal process. The arrangement will replace in part the freeing orders that can currently be used in situations in which parents consent to relinquishment.
 Of course freeing orders can also be made against parents' wishes, but not under clause 19, in which the order is voluntary. It will be used solely in cases in which parents want to relinquish a child for adoption, hence the presumption that they will not want to be notified of the final adoption hearing. It is right that parents should be able to decide that they want to receive notice of the final adoption order hearing, and subsection (4) provides for that; if parents opt in, the provisions in clause 126(4)(c)(ii) apply and they should automatically receive notice. However, after giving their consent, they can decide at any point that they want to opt out of the notice, and they can subsequently opt back in again.

Tim Loughton: Before the Minister befogs us with references to various clauses, may I ask her—an answer will provide a useful background to the clause—whether she knows the approximate number of adoptions wherein parents withdraw consent because they have had a change of heart at the eleventh hour? How relevant is the possibility of people changing their mind?

Jacqui Smith: I do not know the answer to that off the top of my head, but I shall write to the hon. Gentleman. I emphasise that advance consent to adoption is designed to enable parents in the rare cases in which they want to relinquish their children and to consent in advance to do so. The prescribed form of consent will explain that to parents and, as I said, an independent CAFCASS officer will witness that consent to ensure that it is properly given and that the parents understand what is involved.

Jonathan Djanogly: A straightforward way to proceed would be to ensure that the consent form has a tickbox, so, at the very least, the matter would be considered when consent is given, even though parents can change their minds later on.

Jacqui Smith: I agree that that would be an obvious and sensible way in which to approach the issue of advance consent. The question is whether, given the nature of advance consent, the amendment is appropriate. On balance, I believe that our approach is correct, and I hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful to the Minister for her clarification in respect of a probing amendment. It is a splendid suggestion by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon that there should be a box to tick, like the one on the football pools that says ``no publicity required'' if one is fortunate enough to win.
 I do not completely follow the Minister's logic in her response to the case that I have made. Should it be easier for someone to opt out of the information process than to opt into it, given that a person may not be completely clear about that process? Although she has given us assurances about the way in which the regulations will prescribe explicit written information, I am not entirely assured, but at least she has given undertakings that the matter will be addressed in detail in the accompanying regulations. That is an example of how we are debating the Bill with one arm tied behind our backs because we have not seen the regulations. So much of the Bill depends on the small print, and the devil will be in the detail. When the detail appears, the Committee's work will have been done.

Jacqui Smith: That is why the regulations will be extensively consulted on.

Tim Loughton: Obviously we are pleased about that, but the Government will have the final decision on which consultation to take on board and which will influence the final regulations. That the Government have been entirely uninfluenced thus far by the enormous body of witness statements, submissions and consultation on disclosure of information does not bode well for things being taken on board in future. However, we must take the Minister's word that the regulations will be addressed fully, properly and to the satisfaction of the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Placement orders

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move amendment No. 32, in page 13, line 36, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
`(1) A placement order is an order made by the court authorising a local authority— 
 (a) to place a child for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority; or 
 (b) if the child is already living with the prospective adopters, with the prospective adopters named in the order.'

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 34, in page 14, line 5, after `authority', insert
`or, as the case may be, with prospective adopters with whom the child is already'.

Sandra Gidley: The aim of the amendment is to clarify placement orders. I will use the example of a child who has already been placed with foster carers, those carers want to adopt and that decision is supported by the local authority. Under clause 21, the local authority will be required to apply for a placement order. However the placement order as defined in clause 21 entitles the local authority to place the child with whomever it chooses. It is odd to ask the court to make an order that authorises the local authority to place the child for adoption with anyone it chooses when there already is a plan for an adoption by the current carers. Can the Minister explain the reasons for that apparent anomaly? If the appropriate placement order cannot be achieved, the court would have to consider whether adoption was the correct course of action.

Jacqui Smith: It might be helpful to spell out the fact that clause 20 defines a placement order, which is
``authorising a local authority to place a child for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority.''
 It continues in force until 
``(a) it is revoked . . . 
(b) an adoption is made in respect of the child, or
(c) the child marries or attains the age of 18 years.''
 Only local authorities can apply for placement orders. That is a change from the previous version of the Bill, published earlier this year. Dare I say that the Government have been listening to representations and have responded? Under the previous Bill, voluntary adoption agencies applied for placement orders. Consultation suggested that it was inappropriate for a private voluntary sector body to be able to seek a court order to place a child compulsorily for adoption against the parents' wishes. The Government agreed and made the change. 
 Subsection (2) provides that a court may not make a placement order unless the child is already subject to a care order or the court has the power to make a care order under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989. The court must be satisfied that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm because he is not receiving what is reasonably expected of a parent. That is another important change from the March version of the Bill, and one that delivers our commitment to align adoption legislation with the Children Act. The effect is that the same threshold for compulsory intervention in family life applies where a local authority seeks to place a child for adoption without parental consent. That is the right position. The Children Act threshold is widely accepted and well understood, and it should apply in this respect. 
 The effect of the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) would be that, when a placement order is made for a child who is already living with prospective adopters, the order would authorise that specific placement, not placement for adoption generally. The main problem with that proposal is the question of what would happen in the regrettable event of the placement breaking down.

Sandra Gidley: That was the point I was trying to make, albeit slightly differently. If the local authority is convinced that adoption is the right choice, there is obviously a problem if a breakdown occurs. In such a case the court would have to reconsider whether adoption was the right course to take. Surely that would be determined by whether the foster care was at a stage where the child had been with those foster parents for a long time, and whether coming to that decision had involved a long process.

Jacqui Smith: I believe that the situation is precisely the reverse. If, as the hon. Lady appears to be suggesting, the placement order was a specific placement order, relating to a specific placement, and if that placement broke down, the local authority would not be authorised to place the child elsewhere.
 The terms of the placement order as envisaged under the Bill enable a child to remain placed with foster carers if those foster carers had originally planned to adopt—that seems to be what the hon. Lady is concerned about. However, if that placement broke down and if the local authority still thought that the child should be placed for adoption, it would not have to return to court seeking another placement order before it could place the child for adoption again. Such a process would lead to harmful delays for the child in cases where a suitable alternative adoptive family was available. 
 The issue of whether placement orders should be general or specific was a key question posed during the public consultation on the placement proposals conducted by the Conservative Government in 1994. The responses to that consultation were strongly in favour of general placement orders on the grounds that they made the process both simpler and more flexible. 
 The purpose of placement orders is to enable the court to decide whether placement for adoption is in the best interests of the child. The identity of any prospective adopters will clearly be relevant if the child is already placed or if a potential match has been provisionally identified, but the court is essentially being asked to take a decision in principle that the child ought to be placed for adoption. It is not being asked to select and match the child with prospective adopters—that is a role for which adoption agencies have the proper skills and that they are equipped to perform. With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Sandra Gidley: That clarification is useful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move that amendment No. 33, in page 13, line 42, after `met' insert
`in which case if the court makes a placement order it shall also make a care order'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 38, in page 17, line 42, leave out subsection (1).

Sandra Gidley: This is another probing amendment, because it is by no means clear why the framework in the Bill makes placement orders an alternative to care orders instead of simply an adjunct. Perhaps the Minister could explain why the Government think it necessary in effect to give children who are the subject of placement orders a separate status.
 Clause 20(2) states: 
``The court may not make a placement order in respect of a child unless—
(a) the child is subject to a care order,''
 but clause 28, which deals with further consequences of care orders, states: 
``Where a placement order is made in respect of a child . . . subject to a care order . . . the care order does not have any effect at any time when the placement order is in force.''
 Trying to understand how it will work in practice is like bashing one's head against a brick wall. 
 Under a care order made under the Children Act, the local authority would have parental responsibility, but clause 51 provides that certain Children Act duties may be modified by regulations: examples include ascertaining and taking into account the views of parents and others to promote contact with the parents. It is hard to see why no reference is made to modifying section 23 of the Children Act, under which local authorities have a duty to make arrangements to enable a child to live with a parent, guardian or relative. Is it considered that the placement order automatically removes that duty? 
 The purpose of the amendments is to tease out whether the Government believe that it is feasible to have a placement order as an adjunct to a care order rather than provide for a separate scheme. If the amendment were accepted, clauses 25 and 26 would have to be modified.

Jacqui Smith: To respond to the hon. Lady's last point first, providing for the care order and placement order to run in parallel could lead to legal confusion because, for example, they are subject to different rules for discharge and revocation, for removing the child, and for contact with family members and others. We have taken the simplest approach in line with the principle that children should be subject to the fewest number of orders to provide them with the necessary protection.

Sandra Gidley: One of the themes running through our discussion is that of trying to make the Bill mirror the Children Act as closely as possible, so what is the reason for having different discharge rules and regulations?

Jacqui Smith: I shall come to those points later.
 The amendment would require the court to make a care order whenever it made a placement order, unless the child was already subject to a care order. Under clause 28, the care order would be instantly suspended for the duration of the placement order, but if the placement order were revoked, the care order would automatically revive, placing the child in the care of the local authority. The current provisions provide the court with the flexibility to make the most appropriate arrangements on the discharge of a placement order, taking account of its full range of powers. Amendment No. 38, as the hon. Lady said, provides that the making of a placement order does not suspend any pre-existing care order. 
 To come to the important point about protecting the child, the Government believe that the amendment is unnecessary. The placement order provides the local authority with all the powers it needs: it has parental responsibility for the child and, as with care orders, it may, if necessary, restrict the parents' ability to exercise their parental responsibility. Under clause 33, no one other than the authority may remove the child from the placement unless that is done under a specific legal power or the child is arrested. As placed children will be looked-after children, the authority will be under the same general duties set out in section 22 of the Children Act to safeguard and promote the child's welfare, appropriately modified for adoption this is the important point through regulations made under clause 51. If a placement order were revoked, any pre-existing care order would automatically revive, so the child would continue to be protected. 
 The hon. Lady asked why the placement order is separate from the care order and the implication of her question was why not just use a care order? The care order is not specific. The placement order is intended to ensure that when placement for adoption is planned and parents have not consented, there is a court decision specifically on that matter. That is one way in which it is specifically related to the needs of adoption. The other issue, as the hon. Lady rightly said and as I have suggested, is that modification will be necessary through regulations made under clause 51. 
 The hon. Lady asked why there are different discharge arrangements, and we will come to that when we consider clause 23. However, the limits on discharge for placement orders allow the local authority time—12 months—in which to find an adoptive placement if the court has decided that the child should be placed. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Lady that distinctively different provisions and considerations are necessary for placement orders.

Hilton Dawson: In circumstances where the threshold conditions have been proved, would not the arrangement that my hon. Friend describes leave a child in an unfortunate limbo if a placement proves impossible to find and they do not have the legal backing of a care order?

Jacqui Smith: There are three possible scenarios. First, a care order could already be running; if so, the care order would come back into operation if the placement order were revoked. Secondly, a local authority could apply simultaneously for a placement order and a care order. Thirdly, an application could be made to revoke a placement order, in which case the local authority would know as much and could apply for a care order.
 Because there are different adoption circumstances, it is necessary to make separate provision through placement orders. So far as running both types of order simultaneously is concerned, we need, as I have said, to limit the number of orders and the complexity of the system.

Elfyn Llwyd: The hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre makes a very important point. Where the placement order breaks down—the third option to which the Minister referred—there is an obvious and immediate need for a care order, but what about the child's welfare during the gap between the cessation of the placement order and the application for a care order? What happens if the local authority does not act quickly enough? There is a potential limbo, which is the valid point that the hon. Gentleman was addressing.

Jacqui Smith: It is a valid point, but I have given a valid response. If the local authority was concerned about that problem at the time of application, it could apply for both a placement order and a care order—[Interruption.]

George Stevenson: Order. If the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) wants to intervene, he must do so in the appropriate manner.

Jacqui Smith: As I was saying, the local authority could apply for a placement order and a care order at the same time. In effect, the care order would not operate while the placement order was in force, but would spring into life if the placement order were revoked. Alternatively, because the local authority would be aware of an application to revoke the placement order, it could act quickly to ensure that the care order was in place.

Elfyn Llwyd: In a perfect world, the Minister is right.

Sandra Gidley: I still feel that the provision is unnecessarily complex and will give rise to difficulties in practice. However, it is not worth pressing the matter to a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 96, in page 14, line 6, after `with', insert
`and every effort has been made to inform each parent or guardian or other persons holding parental responsibility.'.
 In the true tradition of probing, this is another probing amendment. It deals with consultation on placement orders and its purpose is to plug any potential loopholes and ensure that everyone is satisfied that they have had ample opportunity to make their representations on the process and to be kept informed about the stage that it has reached and what is still to come. 
 If the court decides to go ahead with a making a placement order regardless of the consent of the parent or guardian—I am still keen to get the Minister's clarification regarding other persons with parental responsibility—is that consent, in effect, overruled by default if the parent or guardian has not appeared on the scene to make a rejection of consent order? The Bill should ensure that the process cannot proceed by default because for some reason the parent or guardian was not traced. Should the consent of both parents or both guardians be obtained? A birth father—more likely than a birth mother—may for various reasons have disappeared from the scene, leading to the circumstances that made an adoption necessary in the first place. 
 It should be incumbent on the court to ensure that each parent or person with parental responsibility has been informed about the process that is taking place and the stage that it has reached; otherwise, the whole procedure could take place in the ignorance of certain key individuals. I am sure that that would happen in only a minority of cases, but we are trying to plug the loophole so that nobody can say that they were left in the dark and that had they been properly informed, their views would have been different, or they could have made representations to the court on why their consent should not be dispensed with. 
 The issue requires probing and clarification. Which of the parents or parental responsibility candidates need to have their consent dispensed with, and to what lengths will the court go before it makes that decision?

Jacqui Smith: I hope to be able to reassure and educate the hon. Gentleman. The amendment seems to be designed to ensure that the courts cannot make a placement order unless every effort has been made to notify the parents and everyone else with parental responsibility. The arrangements for notification are set out in clause 126, which provides that the court rules must require certain persons to be notified of the date and place where the application will be heard, and of the fact that unless the person wishes or the court requires it, the person need not attend. The people who have to be notified are those whose consent is needed for the making of the placement order, in so far as they can be found.
 In the light of the Opposition's confusion on Tuesday, it might be useful to remind them who those people are. Under the Bill, the list of people whose consent is required for the making of a placement order or an adoption order follows the model of the Adoption Act 1976. First are the natural parents of the child who have parental responsibility. Under the Children Act 1989, mothers automatically have parental responsibility, as do married fathers; unmarried fathers can acquire parental responsibility either by marrying the mother of their child or, under section 4 of the Act, by agreement with the mother or by a court order. Under clause 106 of the Bill, they will also acquire parental responsibility automatically if they jointly register the birth with the mother. 
 The second person whose consent is required is any guardian of the child. That means a guardian who may be appointed under section 5 of the 1989 Act to act in the event of the parent's death. I think that that covers the point made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) on Tuesday. Once the Bill is enacted, special guardians will also be included. 
 Those individuals are the only people who can consent to the adoption of a child under the 1976 Act. Under the Bill, they are the people who can consent to a placement order or an adoption order. Other people may have parental responsibility—as we have discussed, it is possible for parental responsibility to be shared—but it would not be appropriate for those others to consent to adoption or a placement order.

Jonathan Djanogly: Is the Minister satisfied that the procedures for finding the people who must give consent are adequate? Presumably there are such procedures, although it is not an area with which I am familiar. Is there a need to review them?

Jacqui Smith: With some provisos, which I might mention in a moment, we are confident that the procedures are adequate. As I have said, clause 126 lays down the process for notifying the relevant persons. It also provides that if none of them can be found—I think that that is what the hon. Gentleman means—any relative prescribed in the court rules who can be found should be notified instead; however, they cannot give consent. As we discussed on Tuesday, ``relative'' is defined in clause 129 as a person:
``in relation to a child . . . a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether of the full blood or half-blood or by marriage''.
 The hon. Gentleman might also have been referring to the procedures for finding and notifying unmarried fathers. Under the Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983, a local authority must make reasonable efforts to contact an unmarried father if it thinks that doing so is in the child's best interests. We will place a similar requirement on agencies in the new regulations.

Tim Loughton: I am a little wiser but not entirely enlightened by the Minister's re-explanation of parental responsibility, especially in relation to circumstances in which responsibility is shared and the hierarchy of the people in her list who have to be consulted. She referred to ``reasonable efforts'' to contact unmarried fathers, but that is a moveable feast, so I hope that regulations will specify rather more closely the extent of an authority's investigations—for example, whether they are to be time limited, and whether it delays the process if someone has gone abroad and has to be tracked down to give parental consent. I am still a little unclear about how many boxes need to be ticked off before parental consent can be dispensed with.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman appears to misunderstand. An unmarried father could not grant consent. Only a married father would have parental responsibility and could provide consent in such circumstances.

Tim Loughton: But the fourth category of person on the list that the Minister gave was unmarried fathers who had acquired parental responsibility, so it is not the case that unmarried fathers have no role in giving consent if they have acquired parental responsibility. There is a role for such fathers, under the terms that she outlined.
 It is difficult, without seeing the actual regulations, to understand exactly how the procedure will work but it has been useful to place on record, to close any loopholes, that we should go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that people cannot complain that the procedure has not taken place in the full knowledge of all interested parties at the appropriate stages. Given the Minister's assurances, which go part of the way, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move amendment No. 35, in page 14, line 10, after ``adoption'', insert ``or special guardianship''.
 The amendment is very straightforward and would amend what in some respects appears to be an oversight. The Bill introduces special guardianship orders, which is welcome, but I contend that once a child is placed in a legally approved secure environment, whether by adoption or a special guardianship order, there will be no further need for a placement order. The Government appear to be suggesting that special guardianship orders are in some way less secure. Can the Minister envisage circumstances in which there will be a need to continue a placement order once a special guardianship order is in place?

Jacqui Smith: As the hon. Lady said, the amendment would provide that the making of a special guardianship order automatically discharges a placement order. At the moment, it does not do that, and we think it right that the making of a special guardianship order should not automatically cut across a placement order. We want a court to take a positive decision to revoke a placement order, governed by clause 1 of the Bill and the adoption checklist, rather than automatically revoke it by making a special guardianship order. One reason is that, when making a special guardianship order, the court will look at section 1 of the Children Act, which, as we discussed when debating clause 1, is not specifically tailored to adoption and the issues surrounding it.
 To answer the hon. Lady's last question, when a local authority agrees that special guardianship is appropriate instead of placement for adoption, we envisage that it should apply to discharge the placement order alongside the special guardianship order application. We believe that that is the appropriate process, and the Bill provides for it.

Sandra Gidley: If the Minister envisages that that will happen anyway, what is the problem with putting it in the Bill? The Minister has not clearly answered my question about how those circumstances will arise. A special guardianship order is, for most intents and purposes, not a second best to adoption but an appropriate legal measure when adoption is not appropriate for some reason—perhaps because older children are involved. It seems to me—

George Stevenson: Order. If the hon. Lady wishes to catch my eye to make a further contribution, she is entitled to do so, but interventions should be short. I think that the Minister has got her drift.

Jacqui Smith: I answered the hon. Lady's point when I said that the amendment would automatically ensure that the making of a special guardianship order discharged a placement order without consideration, and that the Government think that there is an argument for the court to make a positive decision to revoke the placement order following, as I have suggested, the appropriate process. The local authority, agreeing that the special guardianship order was appropriate rather than the placement, would then apply to discharge the placement order alongside the special guardianship order application.

Sandra Gidley: I am not completely convinced, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 43, in page 14, line 11, at end insert—
`(d) 2 years after it is issued at which time it must be reviewed.'.
 We continue to wade through clause 20 as the seconds tick away. Under subsection (4), which deals with the lifespan of a placement order, the three conditions under which a placement order continues are given as: revocation, the details of which are under clause 23—I have a hunch we may not come to that; the child is adopted; or the child attains the age of seniority. 
 The amendment is designed to place a time limit on that process, because it is undesirable that a placement order should remain in force for years. All our discussions and all the representations that we have received have shown that speed is of the essence in taking a child out of an unsuitable environment and placing them in a more suitable, long-term, stable situation. That is in the interests of all the children with whom the Bill deals. A placement order that goes on and on and does not become a permanent adoption order probably contains a weakness. It is not in a child's interest constantly to live under the shadow of uncertainty about where they will ultimately end up. Alternatively, if a child is subject to a placement order that breaks down, they can go to another placement before eventually ending up in a long-term destination. 
 Other countries deal with the problem more swiftly. Research from Oxford university which other members of the Committee may have received makes for interesting reading. It gives examples from other European countries and further afield. In Sweden, placements away from home must be reviewed every six months, which is shorter than the stipulation that we are trying to impose, which is probably too long. There is, however, a slight difference in that long-term adoption is far less frequent in Sweden. In most cases, the long-term aim is for children to return to their birth parents, but that would be inappropriate for the majority of children whom we are discussing. It is interesting to note that the Swedish have acknowledged the urgency of ensuring that placements do not drag on.

Jonathan Djanogly: Is it not the case that in addition to the regular review, someone other than the social services department that procured the placement order should conduct another review? Perhaps the Minister's Department should do the checks so that an outside body can ensure that everything is being kept up to scratch?

Tim Loughton: The Minister's time is valuable and there are many pressures upon it. Her staff's time is also valuable and there are currently inordinate pressures on them to produce explanations of the Bill and flowcharts. None the less, my hon. Friend makes a good point. If the placement order—[Interruption.] There is pressure on the Minister's time even now. To resume, if a placement order is still in place after two years, it suggests that the order is not working and that urgent action must be taken to place the child in an alternative home that may lead to a permanent adoption order and the permanence, security and long-term well-being that we are trying to achieve. Perhaps reviews should be made after less than two years if a two-year placement order is regarded as an admission of failure. As my hon. Friend suggests, an alternative body should carry out that review, because the social services department that made a placement order is responsible for—
 It being twenty five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [28th June] and the Order of the Committee [27th November], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

George Stevenson: The Question is that the amendment be made. As many as are of that opinion, say aye.

Hon. Members: Aye.

George Stevenson: To the contrary, no. The ayes have it, the ayes—

Tim Loughton: Oh, did we get that one?

George Stevenson: I apologise—my hearing aid cannot be working properly. Let me try again.
 Question put, That the amendment be made. 
 Amendment negatived. 
 The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Clauses 20 to 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill 
 Clauses 50 and 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock. {**vert_rule**}